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Abstract
We compare the accuracy of the survey forecasts and forecasts implied by economic
binary options on the U.S. non-farm payroll change. These options are available for a
number of ranges of the announced figure, and each pays $1 if the released non-farm
payroll change falls in the given range. For the first-release data both the market-based
and survey forecasts are biased, while they are rational and approximately equally
accurate for later releases. Both forecasts are more accurate for later releases. Because
of predictability in the revision process, this indicates that the investors in the economic
derivatives market are incapable of taking the measurement error in the preliminary
estimates efficiently into account. This suggests that economic stability could be enhanced
by more accurate first-release figures.
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1 Introduction
Recently, a market for macroecnomic derivatives, i.e., securities involving bets on fu-
ture macroeconomic development, has emerged. For instance, in October 2002, Gold-
man Sachs and Deutsche Bank set up a market that allows investors to buy options
with payo¤s dependent on growth in non-farm payrolls and Euro-area harmonized
CPI, among others. Apart from providing means of hedging against macroeconomic
risks, these derivatives yield economic forecasts. Data from the …rst 2.5 years of this
market were analyzed by Gürkaynak and Wolfers (in press), who found the market-
based forecasts more accurate than those based on a survey.
The payo¤s of the current macroeconomic derivatives depend on the …rst-release
…gures that are inaccurate, and the “…nal” or “true” values of the economic variables
only become available much later, after a large number of revisions. Typically the
…rst-release …gures are biased predictions of later releases that are likely to be close to
the “true” values although revisions may still take place even after several years (see
Swanson and van Dijk, 2006). Because the payo¤s in the economic derivatives market
are determined by the …rst-release …gures, it should be optimal for investors in this
market to attempt to predict these particular data. On the other hand, respondents
in surveys, such as that studied by Gürkaynak and Wolfers (in press), have no such
incentive, but for them it should be optimal to attempt to predict the “true” value
that only becomes available after a long lag.1
Gürkaynak and Wolfers (in press) compared all the forecasts with the …rst-release
…gures. However, from the standpoint of forecasting, the ultimate goal is to forecast
the “true” or “…nal” values, so it would be interesting to see whether the market-
based forecasts are superior to survey forecasts for later releases as well. Moreover,
by comparing the accuracy of the forcasts for di¤erent releases of data it is possible
to assess the degree to which the investors are able to take the measurement error in
1Whether this is really the case, is controversial (see Sørensen and Ottaviani (2006) and the
references therein), but our empirical results support this view.
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the …rst-release data into account and determine what are the data they are actually
attempting to forecast. From the practical point of view, it is important to know
which of the two forecasts are more accurate for the variables we want to forecast,
but the results may also have implications for economic theory. Recently, Bom…m
(2001) showed that the measurement error in preliminary data releases can be a major
source of economic ‡uctuations. This e¤ect, however, depends on the economic agents’
signal extraction capabilities such that if they cannot e¢ciently …lter the noise out
of the …rst-release data, reducing the measurement error would lead to less economic
volatility. On the other hand, if they are able to e¢ciently take the measurement error
into account, macroeconomic volatility increases with improvement in the accuracy of
the data. Hence, if the investors appear to be forecasting the “…nal” …gures instead
of the …rst-release data, this suggests that they are unable to take the measurement
error e¢ciently into account, and, according to Bom…m’s (2001) model, decreasing
the measurement error in …rst-release …gures would then have a stabilizing e¤ect on
the economy.
In this paper, we compare the market-based and survey forecasts of the change in
the U.S. non-farm payroll, for which the entire revision history is readily available.
It turns out, that forecasts are not rational for the …rst-release …gures, unlike later
releases, indicating that the investors as well as professional forecasters are actually at-
tempting to forecast the “true” data. This suggests that the investors are not capable
of taking the measurement error in …rst-release data e¢ciently into account, lending
support to the idea that enhancing the quality of …rst-release data would decrease
economic ‡uctuations. Moreover, the di¤erences between market-based and survey
forecasts are relatively small, with the survey forecasts actually being somewhat more
accurate for later releases.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The data set is described in Section 2. Section
3 contains the comparisons of the market-based and survey forecasts. In section 4,
we present the results on the density forecasts implied by the option data. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
3
2 Data
In this paper, we consider the U.S. non-farm payroll options, for which the entire
revision history is readily available. Speci…cally, we focus on the “digital range”,
a contract paying $1 if the announced economic number lies between two adjacent
strike prices. Assuming risk neutrality, each price can be interpreted as probability
of the change in the non-farm payroll falling in the given range. The options are
traded in auctions for each data release, and our data set comprises the 33 monthly
auctions from October 2002 until June 2005. The auction takes place on the morning
of the data release. For details of the institutional arrangements, see Gürkaynak and
Wolfers (in press).
The survey forecasts are released by Money Market Services (MMS) on the Friday
before each data release. The survey sample consists mainly of professional economists
in the …nancial markets, and the respondents are surveyed up to a week before the
derivatives auction.2
The payo¤s are determined with reference to the initial estimate of the growth in
the non-farm payrorolls as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). These
…rst-release …gures are inaccurate, and they will be subsequently revised multiple
times. The entire revision history is extracted from the Real-Time Data Set of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. In the empirical analyses we concentrate on
the data released six and twelve months after the …rst release for ease of exposition.
Because revisions do not take place every month, little additional insight would be
provided by discussing all possible revision dates separately. Ideally, we would like
to consider the “…nal” values that have undergone a greater number of revisions, but
because the market for macroeconomic derivatives has been started only recently,
only approximately one year’s worth of revised estimates are available for the latest
observations in the option data set. Hence, later revisions cannot be considered
2We are grateful to Justin Wolfers for providing the data on derivatives and survey forecasts on
his web page.
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without leaving out observations from our already very limited data set. Still, as the
…gures in Table 1 show, all the initial releases have been revised once after six months
and most of them twice after 12 months, and the revisions can be quite sizeable.
3 Accuracy of Point Forecasts
Following Gürkaynak and Wolfers (in press), we begin the empirical analysis by com-
paring the market-based and survey forecasts to the released …gures. While Gürkay-
nak and Wolfers (in press) only considered the …rst-release data, we present results
also for revised data released six and twelve months after the expiration date of the
option. By studying the forecast errors we get an idea of how accurate the forecasts
implied by the option prices are for each release of data. Panels A and B of Table
2 contain the mean absolute forecast errors (MAE) and root mean squared forecast
errors (RMSE) for each of the three releases considered. For comparison, we also
present results for survey forecasts released by Money Market Services on the Fri-
day before the …rst data release. The table shows quite clearly that, on average, both
market-based and survey forecasts are most accurate for the twelve-month release and
the accuracy improves monotonously after the …rst release. Moreover, the di¤erences
seem to be quite large. Assuming that the releases converge to the most accurate
possible, “…nal”, estimate, this suggests that the agents actually forecast the “…nal”
value, indicating their inability to take the estimation errors made by the BLS into
account. The di¤erences between the market-based and survey forecasts are, in gen-
eral, minor. However, for the …rst-release data, according to the MAE and RMSE
criteria the market-based …gures are more accurate. This is in line with Gürkaynak
and Wolfers (in press) and not surprising since the payo¤s of the derivatives depend
on the …rst-release data. For the twelve-month …gures that are supposedly closest to
the “…nal” value, the survey forecasts are actually more accurate, but the di¤erences
are somewhat smaller than for the …rst-release data. These di¤erences are not statis-
tically signi…cant at conventional signi…cance levels, suggesting that the market-based
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forcasts are not superior to survey forecasts. Median forecasts yield similar results,
and therefore they are not reported.3
To further compare the option-based and survey forecasts, we report in Panel C of
Table 2 the results of the “horse race” regression suggested by Fair and Shller (1990),
where the actual released …gure is regressed on a constant, and the option-based and
survey forecasts. The results for the 6 and 12-month releases di¤er markedly from
those for the …rst release. The regressors are, of course, strongly correlated and,
therefore, the standard errors are large. Still, in line with Gürkaynak and Wolfers
(in press), the estimates suggest that the survey forecast is uninformative in the
case of the …rst-release data, for which the the coe¢cients of the option-based and
survey forecasts are very close to unity and zero, respectively. For the later releases,
however, the estimated coe¢cients suggest that the two forecasts are more or less
equally important, lending support to the results concerning the forecast errors in
Panels A and B.
The results of the test of forecast e¢ciency are presented in Panel D of Table
2. Three conclusions emerge. First, both the option-based and survey forecasts are
downward biased for all three releases of data, but the bias is much larger for the …rst
than the later releases. Second, the di¤erences between the option-based and survey
forecasts are very small. Third, the bias is statistically signi…cant at the 10% level
only for the …rst-release data, with p-values of approximately 0.06 for both forecasts.
For the later releases, the p-values exceed 20%. These results can be interpreted
in favor of the agents’ inability to e¢ciently take into account the estimation error
inherent in the …rst-release data. In other words, the later releases are closer to
what the agents actually are forecasting. This is good news from the viewpoint of
using the market-based and survey forecasts, as they do not seem to be contaminated
by the estimation error inherent in the …rst-release data. On the other hand, the
result reinforces the impression that the agents are not acting rationally in forming
expectations, because the pro…ts accruing from option trading depend on the ability
3The results are available upon request.
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to speci…cally forecast the …rst-release data.
4 Accuracy of Density Forecasts
In addition to the point forecast, the derivatives market yields a full probability
distribution for each date, which facilitates the analysis of the accuracy of density
forecasts for any release of data. Based on the results for the mean predictions above,
our expectation is that the agents’ predictive distribution is consistent rather with
later releases than the …rst release.
To examine the correctness of the conditional predictive distribution of the market
for the di¤erent releases, we consider the probability integral transforms.
??? =
Z ???
0
????¡1 (?) ??? ? = 1? 2? ???? ??
where ????¡1 (¢) is the conditional predictive density extracted from the derivatives
data and ??? is the observed value of the change in the non-farm payroll given by
the ?th release at date ?. If the conditional density is correct, the distribution of the
sequence f???g??=1 is independently and unformly on [0, 1] distributed for each ?. To
check for uniformity, Pearson’s goodness-of-…t test can be used. The test statistic is
based on a histogram of f???g??=1 consisting of ? bins,
?X
?=1
(?? ¡ ???)
???
?
where ?? is the number of observations in the ?th bin. If ??? really is uniformly distrib-
uted, ?? should equal ??? for all ?, i.e., there should be equal number of observations
in each bin. Under the null hypothesis this test statistic follows asymptotically the
chi-square distribution with ?¡ 1 degrees of freedom. In addition to a formal test,
Diebold et al. (1998) recommended examining the uniformity graphically by plotting
the histogram on which the test is based, as this may give further information on the
shortcomings of the predictive distribution. The hypothesis of no serial correlation in
the level and square of the probability integral transform can be tested by using the
standard Ljung-Box test.
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The histograms of the probability integral transform series along with the point-
wise 95% con…dence bands are presented in Figure 1. Only the …rst-release data
exhibits a violation of uniformity; for the later releases, all the bins are included in
the 95% con…dence bands. It seems that the market forecasts put too much emphasis
on the lower tail of the distribution to conform to the …rst-release values. This is in
accordance with the result above that the market forecasts are downward biased for
the …rst-release data but not for later releases. The results of Pearson’s goodness-of-…t
test based on this histogram in Table 3 con…rm this …nding. Uniformity of the prob-
ability integral transform is clearly rejected for the …rst-release data (p-value equals
0.02), while it cannot be rejected for the other two releases at reasonable signi…cance
levels. Autocorrelation in the levels and squares of the probability integral transform
cannot be rejected for any of the releases.
All in all, the results thus indicate that the distribution of the market forecast
is more accurate for the distribution of later releases than that of the …rst release,
in accordance with the results obtained for the mean forecasts above. Because the
later releases are presumably more accurate in the sense of being closer to the “…nal”
or “true” values, these …ndings thus suggests that it is the “true” distribution that
the agents are attempting to forecast. In other words, they are unable to take the
measurement error of the BLS into account, although in the derivatives market it
clearly would be optimal to forecast the erroneous …rst-release …gure, upon which the
payo¤s are determined.
5 Conclusion
We consider the forecasts of the U.S. non-farm payroll change implied by the market
for economic derivatives and the MMS survey. Unlike the recent study by Gürkaynak
and Wolfers (in press), we study the properties of these forecasts with respect to
revised values in addition to the …rst-release data.
The implications of our …ndings are twofold. First, contrary to what the results
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of Gürkaynak and Wolfers (in press) might lead one to believe, the di¤erences in
forecast accuracy between the market-based and survey forecasts are minor, and, as
a matter of fact, the survey forecasts tend to be more accurate for the “…nal” values.
This result emerges from analyzing both the point and density forecasts. Hence,
in light of these …ndings, there is little reason to prefer the market-based to survey
forecasts. Second, investors in the economic derivatives market are unable to take
the measurement error in the initial estimates of the BLS e¢ciently into account, but
they seem to be forecasting the “true” non-farm payroll change, although their pro…ts
depend on accurately forecasting the …rst-release data. According to Bom…m’s (2001)
model, this lends support to the idea that improvements in the quality of …rst-release
data would decrease economic ‡uctuations.
Because the market for economic derivatives has existed for only a short time,
the sample considered is relatively small, and although the results are qualitatively
consistent, strong statistical signi…cance is di¢cult to establish. The derivatives data
are also very recent, so that the even the most recent revised estimates of the non-farm
payroll changes available may still deviate from the “…nal” values. Therefore, it would
be interesting to see whether the obtained conclusions hold in an extended data set.
It might also be worth studying whether the predictability in the revision process
could be exploited to make excess pro…ts in the economic derivatives market. We
only considered the market for derivatives on the U.S. non-farm payroll change, but
it would be interesting to see whether similar results are obtained for other economic
derivatives. We leave these issues for future research.
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Figure 1: Probability Integral Transforms of the First, Six-Month and Twelve-Month
Releases of the Non-Farm Payroll Change based on the Derivatives Data.
11
Table 1: First, Six-Month and Twelve-Month Releases of the Change in the Non-Farm
Payroll (Thousands of New Jobs).
Date Release Date Release
First 6-Month 12-Month First 6-Month 12-Month
2002:10 –43 –84 65 2004:3 21 83 94
2002:11 –5 69 119 2004:4 308 353 320
2002:12 –40 1 1 2004:5 288 324 337
2003:1 –101 –211 –211 2004:6 248 208 250
2003:2 143 158 94 2004:7 112 96 106
2003:3 –308 –121 –159 2004:8 32 83 83
2003:4 –108 –151 –110 2004:9 144 188 188
2003:5 –48 –22 –20 2004:10 96 130 130
2003:6 –17 –76 –28 2004:11 337 282 282
2003:7 –30 –83 –14 2004:12 112 132 132
2003:8 –44 –45 –45 2005:1 157 155 155
2003:9 –93 –25 –25 2005:2 146 124 76
2003:10 57 67 67 2005:3 262 300 265
2003:11 126 88 88 2005:4 110 122 140
2003:12 57 83 83 2005:5 274 292 228
2004:1 1 8 8 2005:6 78 126 106
2004:2 112 159 117
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Table 2: Comparing the Accuracy and E¢ciency of the Mean Forecasts for the First,
Six-Month and Twelve-Month Releases of the Change in the Non-Farm Payroll.
Release
First 6-Month 12-Month
Panel A: Mean Absolute Error (MAE)
Market 84.2 (11.3) 82.9 (9.6) 77.5 (10.2)
Survey 86.1 (11.4) 82.1 (10.1) 76.8 (10.1)
Panel B: Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE)
Market 105.6 (48.9) 99.1 (47.8) 96.9 (47.2)
Survey 107.6 (57.8) 100.0 (48.9) 95.2 (47.4)
Panel C: Horse Race Regression
??????? = ?+ ???????? + ????????
Market 0.97 (0.87) 0.57 (0.83) 0.43 (0.80)
Survey –0.02 (0.97) 0.44 (0.92) 0.50 (0.89)
Panel D: E¢ciency Regression
???????? ?????? = ?
Market –33.79 (18.05) –20.79 (17.29) –17.48 (16.54)
Survey –33.92 (17.68) –20.92 (17.12) –17.61 (16.84)
Market and Survey denote the market-based and survey forecasts, respec-
tively. The …gures in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table 3: Testing the Accuracy of the Predictive Distributions implied by the Deriva-
tives for the Non-Farm Payroll Change.
Release
First 6-Month 12-Month
Pearson’s Goodness-of-Fit Test 0.020 0.337 0.511
Level Autocorrelation Test 0.458 0.358 0.333
Square Autocorrelation Test 0.110 0.296 0.627
The …gures are marginal signi…cance levels.
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